

THESES,

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND PANAMA CANAL,

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BY

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The Monroe Doctrine and Panama Canal.

Whenever European interests come in conflict with those of the United States upon the Western continents, our people almost invariably make their appeal to the Monroe Doctrine. It has taken a firm hold on the popular mind, and is the chief maxim of our foreign policy. It is the bulwark that has saved us from entangling and ruinous alliances, and has prevented the extension of the European political system to this continent. It touches the instinct of national safety, and our people have become so imbued or permeated with the principle that it represents to discerning foreign statesmen a deep-rooted and powerful factor in the character of the American people, just as it is with the Russian nation concerning the legendary

will of Peter the Great. Patriotic citizens could not fail to respond when a president of our country appeals to it in an emergency. That this doctrine will be appealed to and reaffirmed by statesmen in the future as in the past, is highly probable. Let us, then, inquire into the history of its origin and of its application to the practical policy of the United States, and especially with reference to the Panama Canal.

When our fathers established this government, even then they recognized the advantages of their isolation. A great ocean rolled between them and their former foe. And, while occasionally some foreign supporters of monarchical institutions deplored the apparent success of our experiment of self-government, the majority of Europeans were indifferent to the growth and development of this republic. Still, there was an apprehension among our people that European governments viewed with

ill-feeling the rapidly increasing power of the United States. In the newspapers, and in the speeches of public men may be found the expression of this apprehension and of the opinion that to preserve our institutions we must avoid all entangling alliances with foreign nations. This became a matter of such importance that President Washington devoted several paragraphs of his Farewell Address to its presentation. The following extract from the Address is sufficient to show the sentiment of the people:-

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests,

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which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Since she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Since, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

"Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyances; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation;

when we may choose peace or war as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?"

In this extract from Washington's Farewell Address and in other unmentioned sources, may be found the germs of the Monroe Doctrine. From these sources originated the American idea of non-intervention by us in European affairs, and likewise by Europe, in ours—an idea that has gradually grown and obtained an ineradicable hold upon the popular mind.

For about two and a quarter centuries, the

powers of Europe have exercised the right of interference whenever any of the great powers have endeavored to disturb the equilibrium of political power upon that continent. This doctrine is called the "Balance of power." All attempts to make the United States a party to it have failed. Many have praised the doctrine as being the best means of preserving the proper ratio of power among the nations, but others have denounced it as a barbarous principle, and a mere pretext for unjustifiable interference by the stronger powers in the political affairs of the weaker. John Bright says it is the cause of "dishonorable and bloody conflicts," Robert Lowe, "that tradition which has been the pest of Europe."

By a stretch of this doctrine, the European powers claimed the right to put down insurrections on that continent, and that, too, when their aid was not

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asked by the country in which the insurrection broke out. Thus the Allied Powers intervened in the affairs of France and finally procured the removal of the army of occupation from that country. Again, in 1822, a French army with the approval of the other Powers put down the insurrection in Spain. The Spanish colonies on this continent had been in rebellion since 1812, and Spain seemed not able to conquer them. The United States acknowledged their independence. Then, therefore, on December 5, 1822, the allied monarchs declared their resolution "to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place or under whatever form it might appear," then it was that John Q. Adams, our Secretary of State, began to formulate those principles or maxims which, under the name of the Monroe Doctrine, appeared later in President Monroe's message to Congress dated December 2, 1823. That the United States was fortunate in having

so able a man as Mr. Adams at the head of the Department of State, is apparent to anyone. When a boy, he had been to the Courts of Europe in company with his father and had afterwards represented this country at the Netherlands, Russia, Prussia, Portugal, at London, and at the treaty of Ghent. He thus became thoroughly versed in European diplomacy and gained a deep insight into the spirit and tendency of monarchical institutions. He had an indomitable will and resolute patriotism. No man could better appreciate the dangers to liberty and to the rights of the people.

At the beginning of this century the title to the country on the Northwestern shores of North America was claimed by Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. Up to 1823, all attempts to settle with Russia had failed. On July 17, of this year, Baron Tugol, the Russian minister asked Mr. Adams what instructions

he was going to send to Mr. Middleton, our minister to Russia. Mr. Adams boldly answered him that "we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent; and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments." Here then is the announcement of the first branch of the Monroe Doctrine over four months before it appeared in the President's message.

After the revolution of the Spanish-American colonies, Great Britain had built up considerable commercial interests with them, and this made her as anxious to maintain the Republic of Mexico and Central America as the United States. Mr. Canning, the English minister for Foreign Affairs was afraid Russia and France would enter into an agreement to reconquer the Spanish provinces and so was anxious to enlist the United

States in a protest against such an intervention by the allied powers. Concerning the Spanish-American states, we have this communication of Mr. Adams to Mr. Rush, our minister to England, dated July 3, 1823: - "These independent nations will possess the rights incident to that condition and their territories will of course be subject to no exclusive right of navigation in their vicinity, or of access to them of any foreign nation. A necessary consequence of this will be, that the American continents henceforth will no longer be subject to colonization."

It is plain that the controversy between the United States and Great Britain, in the year 1823, arose from the desire of the latter to preserve her markets in the Spanish-American states. For three hundred years previous to the revolt of the Spanish-American colonies, Great Britain had been shut out from their markets by the jealous policy of Spain. And it was the fear of losing these

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markets that determined Mr. Canning to throw the whole weight of British power and British influence against the re-Establishment, in the New World, of that policy by which, for three centuries, Spain had closed the ports of both oceans from the Gulf of Mexico to Cape Horn, against the commerce of the world. To this end, Mr. Canning, in August 1823 proposed to Mr. Rush that the governments of England and the United States should publish "a joint declaration before Europe" in opposition to the schemes of the alliance concerning this continent. He had several conversations with Mr. Rush and laid several other projects before him all of which were declined except one to which Mr. Rush attached a condition and that being rejected by Mr. Canning it, too, fell through. When, therefore, Mr. Rush communicated the substance of these conversations to Mr. Adams, the latter saw the

need of vigorous measures on the part of the President. Mr. Adams had trouble in bringing the President to take the firm and advanced position desired by himself. Mr. Monroe feared the principles formulated by Mr. Adams, and which he was asked to include in his message, would not be acceptable to the English government. He was afraid of offending the Russian Emperor. He dreaded the complications that might possibly arise from giving expression to them and he was anxious and uncertain as to the support of the people and especially the great party leaders. He consulted with Mr. Madison and Mr. Jefferson, the former declaring that the circumstances of the case and our relations to the new republics were such as to call "for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade." Mr. Jefferson was even more to the point: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the brails of Europe. Our

second, never to suffer Europe to meddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." He also consulted General Jackson who assured him that he was ready to draw his sword, if necessary, to defend the positions taken by the Secretary of State. His hesitation was finally overcome by the boldness and earnestness of Mr. Adams and he finally adopted as his own the declaration prepared by his Secretary. Accordingly, we find in his message of December 2, 1823, the following principles known as the Monroe Doctrine:-

1.- "The occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American Continents by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by European powers.

2. "We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.

3. "With the existing colonies or dependences of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere; but with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great considerations and on just principles acknowledged, we would not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

The effect of this declaration in Europe was highly gratifying to patriotic American statesmen. The message on its arrival in England produced considerable excitement. While the article in reference to colonization did not meet with their approval, the one treating of non-intervention by Europe was hailed with joy, and even such noted members of Parliament, as Lord Brougham, Sir James Mackintosh, and Lord John Russell spoke in praise of it. The deputies of the Spanish-American States were overjoyed, and the safety of the new states from European oppression seemed no longer doubtful. Its effects upon the then pending negotiations with Russia were of such a powerful character that the Emperor withdrew a portion of his pretensions to exclusive trade on the Northwest coast and fixed the parallel of $54^{\circ} 40'$ as the line between the two countries. No two gov-

ernments in the civilized world present a contrast so divergent in all their political principles as that of the United States and Russia. Yet a longer period of unbroken friendship between this republic and any other country has not existed. The explanation may be found in the reply of Emperor Alexander to one of our ministers, "Your government and mine," said he, "are the only logical governments in the world. Either the whole people or one man is entitled to rule."

Soon after Mr. Adams's accession to the presidency, an opportunity to continue the policy of his predecessor was presented by the invitation of several South American republics to our government to take part in the Congress of American States to be held at Panama. Spain had not yet given up hopes of reconquering her former colonies, but this was impossible without the aid of some other European power. Their independence being acknowledged by the

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United States, the young republics called a Congress at Panama to discuss measures looking to the welfare and progress of American continents. The United States was invited to participate, but, through delay, her envoys did not reach Panama until the Congress had met, finished its work and adjourned. In his message of 1826, the President considers the question as to whether the acceptance of the invitation might not have a tendency to change the policy, advocated by Washington, of avoiding entangling alliances, and comes to the conclusion that the acceptance of the invitation "far from conflicting with that policy, is directly deducible from and conformable with it;" and he further said that it was no less conformable to President Monroe's declaration concerning the extension of the European political system to this hemisphere.

In 1848, during the trouble with Yucatan, President Polk strongly re-asserted the Monroe Doctrine, and

expressed his "Cordial concurrence in its wisdom and sound policy," and said that the "existing rights of every European nation should be respected; but it is due alike to our safety and our interests that the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, that no future European colony or dominion shall, with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent."

The island of Cuba has been a source of great concern to Europeans as well as to Americans. Rich in natural resources and commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, the Mediterranean of the West and the outlet of the Mississippi, the island of Cuba with her fine and abundant harbours, is a prize which any nation may fondly covet. It is easily seen that with the completion of the Isthmian canal, the commerce of

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that region must come more or less under the control or supervision of the fleets that find a shelter in her numerous harbours. Although our government has repeatedly failed in negotiating the purchase of this island, yet we have said to the world that it is our policy so long as Cuba remains in the hands of Spain, to let her remain there in peace; but if Cuba pass from her control, it shall not be into other hands than ours.

The attempt to plant an Austro-French empire in Mexico was a scheme of the French emperor, which he, no doubt, would not have undertaken had he known the War of the Rebellion would not be successful. He hoped by this scheme to reap great commercial advantages and to break down and bring discredit upon the American system. During all this trouble, our government adhered to the Monroe Doctrine, first,

in demanding explanations from France as to her intentions regarding Mexico; her answer in every case was, that her sole purpose was to enforce the financial claims of the Emperor; second, this government never, during the entire period of French occupation of Mexico, recognized the French scheme, but instead recognized the Government of Juarez; third, as soon as our civil war ended, Mr. Seward warned the Government of France of what she might expect by prolonging the stay of her troops in Mexico. In fact our relations with France became very delicate. We had General Sheridan on the Mexican frontier with seventy-five thousand men. But France yielded and promised to withdraw her troops.

Many Europeans thought this act of the Emperor in attempting to found an empire in

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Mexico, "extringuished the Monroe Doctrine." But the following statement of Sir Edward Creasy shows that all of them do not think so:— "The United States (occupied by their own civil war which was then raging) did not actually send troops to oppose the French in Mexico, but they steadily refused to recognize Maximilian, or any government except a republican government in Mexico; and the language of their statesmen exhibited the fullest development of the Monroe Doctrine."

Mr. Creasy's conclusions are correct. Although we were engaged in civil war and so could not repel French aggression by force of arms, yet, as has already been stated, we demanded explanations from France, and were assured that she meditated no interference in the affairs of Mexico, but that she merely intended with the troops stationed there, to

protect French creditors. But, with the ending of our civil war, Mr Seward brought such a pressure upon the French government that she withdrew her troops.

In the year 1849, Mr. Wise, our representative at Guatemala, signed a treaty with the Republic of Nicaragua under which that country granted to the United States an exclusive right of way across her territory for an inter-oceanic canal. The United States guaranteed to Nicaragua the protection of her entire territory, and to support her in any war for its defense. It was well known, at the time this treaty was made, that Great Britain had assumed a protectorate over the Mosquito Indians of the Isthmus, and that, when trouble arose between these Indians and the Nicaraguans, and the latter hoisted their flag in San Juan del Norte, which was regarded as the necessary terminal point of any railroad or canal across

the Isthmus within the republic. Great Britain had espoused the cause of the Indians and had compelled the Nicaraguans to come to terms. There were rumors afloat that certain factions in Nicaragua were seeking aid from lawless persons in the United States for the purpose of stirring up domestic trouble in that country. Regarded, however, from an impartial standpoint, it will be seen that the Wise treaty was substantially in accord with the principles laid down by Adams and Monroe in 1823.

At the time this treaty was made, Mr. Clayton, of Delaware, was Secretary of State. Seeing, as he thought, an element of coming difficulty with Great Britain, he sent for Mr. Crampton, the British minister, and, expressing his disapproval of the Wise treaty, urged him to assure Her Majesty that his anxious desire was to enter into joint arrangements

for the settlement of the canal question first, and next, the claims of Nicaragua. Note the words "joint arrangements," etc. That anything can be more antagonistic to the spirit of Washington's Farewell Address and the declarations of Mr. Adams can hardly be imagined. It is a painful and disagreeable page in our diplomacy. Mr. Crampton wrote to Lord Palmerston, the British Premier, that Mr. Clayton had appealed to him very pathetically concerning "the embarrassing situation" in which our government was placed by the Wise treaty. "You know," said he, "that the government have no majority in the Senate; you know the treaty will be called for by Congress; the substance of it, indeed, has already found its way into the newspapers. You are aware of the opinion which, whether right or wrong, is generally entertained in this country of the claim of the Mosquito chief to any part of the territory claimed by

Nicaragua, and you can form an idea of the eagerness with which the party opposed to the government will avail themselves of the opportunity of either forcing us into collision with Great Britain on this subject, or of making it appear that we have abandoned, through pusillanimity, great and splendid advantages fairly secured to the country by treaty." Here is the humiliating spectacle, scarcely paralleled in the annals of diplomacy, of the premier of a great nation, prostrating himself at the feet of the envoy of another. Finally, Sir Henry Bulwer and Mr. Crampton concluded, on April 19, 1850, the treaty known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The main points in this treaty, which concern the United States are the following:-

1. Neither government "will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume

or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America."

2. The vessels of both countries, in case of war between them, shall, while traversing the canal be exempted from blockade, detention, or capture.

3. The contracting parties to guarantee the protection and neutrality of the canal when completed.

4. Both governments to extend their protection by treaty to all other communications over the Isthmus whether by canal or by ship-railway.

This treaty is utterly opposed to the Monroe Doctrine and has caused volumes upon volumes of discussion and criticism. Instead of securing peace and good will between Great Britain, Central America, and ourselves, it has continued to engender quarrels, misunderstandings, and even perils of war, until dropped by tacit consent of both nations. It led to the attack

upon Greytown by our fleet in retaliation for outrages upon American citizens—outrages instigated by British officials exercising unjust and illegal authority.

England's claim to Honduras and her occupation of the Bay Islands were plain infringements of the treaty stipulations. It is an incubus that has darkened our fair horizon, disturbed our tranquility, hampered and delayed, ever since its adoption, the solution of great commercial and international questions of serious importance to the prosperity and peace not only of this country but of the Central American states as well. Its horrid specter has been dragged forth to vex and disturb the settlement of the Panama canal question.

While our great civil war was in progress, nothing was said about the canal. After its close, however, it began to be discussed and on May 15, 1879, there was held in Paris at the call and under the direc-

tion of Ferdinand de Lesseps, an Inter-oceanic Canal Congress. The publication of the deliberations of this Congress created some excitement in the popular mind of this country. President Hayes, on March 9, 1880, laid before Congress, his views as follows:—

1. The canal shall be under American control. If the sovereignty or rights of other nations conflict with this policy, negotiations should be made to establish the American policy—regard being had for the rights of nations affected by it.

2. The capital invested in the enterprise must be under the protectorate of one or more of the great powers of the world. No European power can be allowed such protectorate.

3. Such a canal would virtually be "a part of the coast line of the United States" and its relations to this country "are matters of paramount concern to the

people of the United States. No other great power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interests and welfare.

Nothing further was done with the matter during President Hayes' administration. The next year, President Garfield, in his message, reiterated the views of predecessor, as to the right and duty of this nation to such control and supervision of any canal across the Isthmus as will protect our national interests. Then began a long and voluminous correspondence on the part of Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State, of the United States and Great Britain growing out of the stand taken by this nation in regard to certain articles of the Clayton-Pulver treaty touching the Panama canal. In Mr. Blaine's first communication to Mr. Lowell, our minister to England, after referring to the reports cir-

culating as to the guarantee of the neutrality of the proposed canal by European powers, he lays down the position of the United States as follows:-

1. The guarantee of neutrality is already provided for by our treaty of 1846 with the Republic of New Granada.

2. The political control of the enterprise must be under the supervision of the United States.

3. The United States has never participated in European congresses touching guarantees of neutrality among European states; and it is the opinion of this government that the introduction of the European political system to this continent "would be attended with danger to the peace and welfare of this nation."

4. This government would view with the most serious concern any agreement on the part of European powers to jointly guarantee the neutrality and to control

the political character of the canal.

5. The position of the United States "is nothing more than the pronounced adherence of the United States to principles long since enunciated by the highest authority of the government, and now, in the judgment of the President, firmly interwoven as an integral and important part of our national policy."

On November 10, 1881, Earl Granville, the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs, stated to Mr. Lowell that the position of Great Britain in this affair was determined by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

Mr. Blaine, in his reply November 19, 1881, goes on to show that the conditions under which the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was made, have passed away never to return; that the protection to the east interests of the Pacific states requires some changes in the treaty; that "the operation of the treaty practically concedes to

Great Britain the control of whatever canal may be built; that, because of her extended colonial possessions, Great Britain has to maintain a powerful fleet, which we do not need; that the United States seeks to defend her interests as Great Britain defends hers; and that it would be as reasonable for the United States to demand a share in the fortifications of the Suez canal or to demand their neutrality, as for England to make a similar demand from this country with regard to the Panama canal; that the treaty binds the United States not to fortify or use her military force in taking precautionary measures, while Great Britain is left free and unhampered; that if no American soldiers are to be allowed on the Isthmus, no British war-vessels should be permitted in the water at either exit of the canal; that our possessions on the Pacific are of vast extent and that Great Britain cannot object to our taking precautions "for

holding absolute control of the great water-way which shall unite the two oceans and which the United States will always insist upon as part of her coast line;" that it was the expectation of aid from British capitalists that induced this government to agree to the treaty, and that she did not furnish it, and now it is no longer a factor in the problem.

Mr. Blaine then proposes to modify the treaty in several points among which are the cancelling of the clause forbidding the United States fortifying the canal and holding joint political control with the country in which it is located; and that part of the treaty providing that stipulations should be made for a joint protectorate of any railroad or canal never having been made, to be regarded as obsolete.

In Mr. Blaine's communication to Mr. Lowell, ten days later he quotes from the communications of General

Cass, Secretary of State under President Buchanan, and Lord Napier, the English representative, regarding a modification of the treaty, as "it was frankly admitted on both sides that the engagements of the treaty were misunderstandingly entered into, imperfectly comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mutually vexatious."

Earl Granville, in his replies to Mr. Blaine's letters of the 19th and 29th, 1881, denies some of Mr. Blaine's statements, calls in question others as being practically and historically incorrect. He thinks the principles underlying Mr. Blaine's argument rather novel in international law, and declares that he did not carry his account of negotiations far enough; that is, that in 1859 and 1860, Great Britain concluded with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua separate treaties in which all questions of difference among the Central American states were settled, and that President Buchanan was so well satisfied

that in his message to Congress in 1860, touching the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, he said that its discordant constructions "have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this Government."

Mr. Frelinghuysen, who succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State, took up the controversy where the latter had left it, and after many months of weary negotiations, dropped it where he found it. His last communication ends with this clause:—"In the conviction, therefore, that the arguments heretofore presented by the United States remain unshaken, the President adheres to the views set forth in the instructions to you of May 8, 1882." The instructions of May 8, 1882, were to Lord Granville and were substantially the same as Mr. Blaine's to the British government.

Lord Granville in closing, denied that all our presidents since Mr. Monroe, have upheld the Monroe Doctrine, and asserted that the agreement in the Clayton-Bulwer

treaty of joint protection of the communication, is sufficient evidence that the Monroe Doctrine is inapplicable to the case.

Besides the above cases there are several minor ones to which the Monroe Doctrine has been applied, but there is not space here to consider them. Those given are the important ones and are sufficient to exhibit the workings of the Monroe Doctrine in its various applications.

All policies of government have their supporters and opponents. Now, what are some of the objections to the Monroe Doctrine as a rule of action or as a principle of international law, and the answer to those objections?

1. It is held that the principle of Colonization is dead and that Mr. Adams, while President, restricted or modified part of the doctrine.

To assert that the settlement of the dispute over the territory in the Northwest ended the application of

the principle of colonization is to claim too much. That President Monroe had in mind only the case of the Northwest territory is not accepted, because it is plain that in using the word "henceforth" he evidently had in mind its future application. But it is asserted that all the soil of this hemisphere is under the control of the different nations here and hence no part of it is subject to colonization. Now, while the first part of this statement is true, the latter part is not, for, within the last fifteen years, England has been getting into her control and colonizing every island and spot of land possible within the Western Hemisphere. France has even planted colonies on portions of the United States of Columbia, carried in her own interest, the late elections in Panama, and changed the names of towns and places along the proposed canal giving them French names. Thus we see there is still room for the application of this doctrine as to colonization. Nor did Mr. Adams restrict the application of the

principle while president. Mr. Adams' statement regarding the parties to be represented at the conference at Panama that "each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders" has sometimes been called a limitation of Mr. Monroe's inhibition against European colonization. But Mr. Dana declares that on the assumption "that a sovereign state would not permit other sovereign states to appropriate its territory by colonization" Mr. Monroe simply set forth "the fact, that the whole continent was within the territory of some responsible state, and not *ferar naturae*, and so open to appropriation; he holds, therefore, that Mr. Adams' proposal is "that each state represented at the congress should make for itself the declaration which Mr. Monroe made for the United States in 1823."

2. To assert that the carrying of Kaseuth in the United States war-steamer "Mississippi," to America

as the guest of this nation in accordance with a resolution of the United States Senate, was a departure from the policy of non-intervention in European affairs, is to make the assertion without sufficient grounds to support it. Now, the fact is, we have nothing to do with political affairs in Europe. We never have made any stipulations regarding European complications. Mr. Kossuth was in Turkey; one of the European powers wanted possession of him; the United States had invited him to make this country a visit. Now, as a matter of fact the United States did not violate any rule of international law in dispatching a war-vessel to Turkey and bringing Mr. Kossuth to America, for its action in this matter was guided by no obligation with or to any foreign power. In every case except one, in which European nations have invited the United States to enter into stipulations touching political affairs on this hemisphere, we have declined to do so. That our government has

adhered to the rule is shown by Mr Rush, our minister to England, refusing to take part in the contemplated European congress upon Spanish-American affairs; and by the refusal of the government to become a party to the armed intervention in Mexico in 1862.

3. The third argument against the Monroe Doctrine is that the government in negotiating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty intended to disregard this doctrine as in any sense binding.

That Mr. Clayton, in negotiating the treaty of 1850, intended to disregard the Monroe Doctrine was confirmed by his own confession some years after when he was engaged in a bitter debate on the floor of the Senate with General Cass, of Michigan as to the origin and meaning of the treaty and as to the intentions of the parties negotiating it. But the abandonment of the principle in a single case cannot be in any sense its surrender as a national doctrine. It

has been re-asserted time and again since 1850, by our presidents and greatest statesmen. It would take volumes to contain all the writings and discussions growing out of this treaty. Finally, the United States and Great Britain being unable to agree as to modifications, it was dropped in accordance with the principle of international law, namely; - "That where the circumstances which accompany the negotiation of a treaty have changed, and the movements in population and wealth have made it necessary, either party has a right to avoid the treaty provided the other refuses to agree to appropriate modifications." It is quite probable that Secretaries Blaine and Frelinghuysen when urging upon Earl Granville their reasons for the modifications of the treaty had in mind not only the rule just stated but also the modification in recent times of the treaty of 1856 closing the Crimean war.

4. It is also claimed by the opponents of the

Monroe Doctrine that the president has no right to declare the principle as binding upon foreign nations or upon the United States, because it has never been confirmed by Congress.

That the Monroe Doctrine has never been confirmed by Congress is true, but that the president has no right to declare the principle as binding upon foreign nations or even upon the United States because it has not received this sanction is not true. The recommendations of Washington's Farewell Address have after shaped the foreign and domestic policy of this government, yet these were never approved by resolution, or embodied in statutes. Besides, questions of diplomacy belong to the executive department of government and it is not one of the rights of Congress to truch upon this branch of the government by laying down rules and principles for such intricate and delicate business. But if it is within the province of Congress to do this, then the action of Congress may be taken as evidence that

the principle is not objectionable. If it were, would it not, ere this, have passed a resolution of condemnation? That it has not done so, that it has quietly acquiesced in it, is presumptive evidence in favor of the validity of the principle. Many rules of international law derive from usage alone their power of imposing obligations upon nations. This principle is an acknowledged precedent of the American people, and it is, to some extent, assented to by Europeans. It has been cherished by the people of this republic and has been repeatedly assented by the majority of American statesmen and by nearly all our presidents since Mr. Monroe.

In this short account we find that sixty-five years ago this nation asserted a policy known as the Monroe Doctrine - a doctrine cherished by the American people from the day of its promulgation; that we have asserted the principle that the powerful and aggressive

nations of Europe should not, with our permission, disturb the status of any American state, nor by colonization or in any other manner, gain practical control over any part of any of those states, nor interfere in their political affairs; we find, also, that this doctrine has been asserted in nearly every case which, in the opinion of the president, demanded it; and that in every case of its application it has produced great results; that it called into existence and maintained the autonomy of the Spanish-American states; prevented Cuba from passing into the control of any European nation other than Spain; compelled Russia to withdraw a part of her claims to the Northwest coast of North America; and destroyed the scheme of the French monarch to establish an Austro-French empire in Mexico; that the one instance of departure from this principle by our government was the case of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which has bred international troubles and vexations ever since until repudiated by our

government because Great Britain unjustly refused to agree to reasonable modifications of it. Now in conclusion, what in regard to the Panama canal?

In 1846, in conformity with the resolution of Congress, the United States made a treaty with the United States of Columbia (New Granada then) in which this government in consideration of the citizens of the United States having the same rights as citizens of Columbia to privileges of transit-way over the Isthmus, guaranteed the protection of the Isthmus and of the territory of the republic of Columbia. In carrying out this part of the agreement as to protection of the Isthmus, the aid of the United States has often been invoked and she has frequently sent troops to Panama. In 1856, '62, '64, '65, and '85, the United States sent troops there to restore order and protect property. For this reason our government has declared that no canal shall be cut across the Isthmus of Panama unless

the United States should have the political control of it. We have, also, objected to the Columbian government seeking European guarantees of freedom and neutrality of the canal. When in 1881, we found that European powers had proposed to the Columbian government to supplement our guarantees with their own, our government notified Columbia and the world that our guarantees did not need any additional guarantees from other powers, and that any movement in this direction by any European power would be regarded as intermeddling in Cis-Atlantic affairs.

But the canal company has been organized and the canal is being built. Has the United States any interest in it or control over it? No. It is being built by Frenchmen. It was organized under French law and French control upon the plea that French law would afford better protection to the capital invested, but the real reason was to endeavor to evade the principles of the Monroe

Doctrine and finally gain a foothold upon the American continent. Shall this great work which exposes our commerce with the Pacific to the mercy of the hostile fleets of the world, be completed and pass to the control of Europe?

In 1885 great destruction of property took place in Panama and the United States forces occupied the towns and line of the Panama railroad. They restored order and protected the property of the Panama Canal Company. But since 1885, the state of Panama has been virtually a French colony. During this time, the French government, by means of its agents, has carried the elections in Panama. Thus upon the pretext that it is necessary for the preservation of peace and the protection of French capital, it has obtained political control in Panama. French colonization schemes have been in progress in various parts of U. S. Columbia, and they have even changed the names of places and towns along the line of the canal,

giving them French names. What next may we expect from so greedy and grasping intruders? Why, she will be taking military possession of the Isthmus on the plea of protection to French interests there. Can this nation afford to stand idly by and see the French government in political control of the canal? Shall these colonization schemes continue without objection or interruption? For the last ten years we have been asserting the Monroe Doctrine — have been telling the world that we were the ones to have political control of the canal; that we would view any interference in the affairs of the Isthmus Canal by European powers "as an unfriendly disposition toward the United States;" we have, I say, been for ten years remonstrating and asserting but have not adopted a single plan or made a single effort toward maintaining the doctrine. It has been all talk. The time has come for the practical assertion and maintenance of the Monroe

Doctrine with reference to the Panama Canal or for its total repudiation or abandonment. It is evident that the French government intends to assume and maintain control of the canal. It intends to maintain the same relation with the Panama canal that Great Britain has maintained with reference to Suez canal. Will we permit this? When shall we be better able than now to resist the encroachments of European powers and to assert and maintain the Monroe Doctrine in its pristine vigor? Will it be when European nations shall have possessed themselves of the greater portion of the islands of this hemisphere and of numerous coaling stations upon the mainland, and shall have fortified them with their mighty fleets? Will we be stronger when France shall have firmly established her authority in Panama and other European nations, following her example shall have found lodgments in South and Central America? What would such

lodgments on the Isthmus mean anyway but a flanking position, a military and naval rendezvous in time of war and an exclusive commercial position in time of peace? European powers, once established upon the Isthmus on plea of guarantee of neutrality of the canal, will then begin their encroachments through various pretexts, upon the South and Central American republics. Then where will be our "freedom from entangling alliances" and the "non-intermeddling by Europeans in Cis-Atlantic affairs?" With the establishment of these powers at our doors, will come the transfer of the doctrine of the "balance of power" to this hemisphere. Then we shall be compelled to create and maintain a vast standing army and a powerful navy in order to re-maintain our position among the powers of the world. Can the United States afford to inflict such a burden of taxation upon her people? Then, let us,

in the language of Senator Bayard "seize the day" and act promptly and energetically so that neither Great Britain nor France nor any other power shall gain a dangerous foothold at our very doors. Let Europe take care of the Eastern hemisphere and the Suez canal, the Western world is fully capable of seeing after its own affairs including the Panama canal.

How far the United States can go in defense of the Monroe Doctrine without a navy is a question that will have to be settled ere long. This nation of sixty millions of people whose pluck, energy, and intelligence have been the admiration of the world, has no land or naval armament of modern construction to place upon her coasts to defend her great and rich cities. These magnificent cities, the marvel of the age, the pride of the republic, and far more opulent than the ancient cities of the orient, are absolutely defenseless. It is known

all over the world that our navy is insignificant; that our forts and batteries are feeble and wretched shams, and our entire equipment of defensive war, a poor, weak and contemptible imitation of power. Look at the modern ironclads of other nations. How ponderous! How powerful! She can plow along under our forts and batteries unconscious of scratch or jar as our heaviest shot are hurled against her ponderous sides. Her iron ribs no more feel or heed their soft caressing contact than the monarch of the forest, the gentle sighing of the zephyrs among his boughs; or she may stand away eight or ten miles—even beyond the horizon—and hurl her mighty shot of more than two thousand pounds into our largest and richest seaboard cities. It seems, then, in view of our helpless condition on the sea, that the first duty of our government should be to create and maintain a navy sufficient to protect and preserve

the integrity of American interests and rights both at home and abroad. With a powerful fleet we shall be better able to practically follow the advice of the Father of our country to "avoid entangling alliances with foreign nations" and to adhere to the maxim of Jefferson "never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with Cis-Atlantic affairs". We shall be able then to insist positively - even to compelling, if need be - that the European powers cease their encroachments upon this continent and that they restrict their political schemes and machinations to their own world, with its plots and intrigues, its "balance of power" and holy alliances, its vast standing armies and powerful navies, its tax-impoorished and down-trodden people, leaving the Western world free to manage its own affairs in its own way. Let us, then, cherish and maintain the Monroe Doctrine, remembering that the national honor, the national interests, the national pride, American spirit, and American man-

hood forbid that it shall be abandoned, but, if necessary to its maintenance and the glory and honor of this republic, let us dismiss the remaining powers from this continent as we already have France, Spain, and Russia, and let the stars and stripes, already planted upon the ice-fields of Northern Alaska, float in triumph over all this grand continent from the polar snows of the North to the glowing sands of Panama.